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Open Innovation and the Management of Intra-firm Conflict 
 
 
Abstract 
We analyse the hitherto unexplored relationship between intra-firm conflict between the research 
and development (R&D) department and central management, conflict alleviation and the choice 
of ‘open’ versus ‘closed’ innovation, in the context of a simple formal model. We find that in the 
presence of (intentional or unintentional) divergence of preferred (R&D) output between the 
R&D department and central management, the decision by central management to adopt an 
‘open’ (versus ‘closed’) innovation approach, may help serve the twin purpose of shifting 
constraints to growth and increasing firm profitability, by alleviating intra-firm conflict.  
 
Keywords: intra-firm conflict, management, open innovation, firm growth. 
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1  Introduction 
 
One of the central tenets of the currently dominating resource based view (RBV) and/or 
dynamic capabilities (DCs) – based theories of the firm is the firms’ presumed superior capability 
in engendering, leveraging and upgrading intra-firm knowledge and innovations (Penrose, 1959; 
Helfat et al. 2007; Teece, 2007; Katkalo eet al., 2010). Such knowledge/dynamic capability may 
help effect endogenous firm growth and sustainable competitive advantages, when they satisfy 
conditions such as difficulty for rivals to imitate.  
A well known theme in the RBV tradition concerns the Penrosean view of managerial 
constraints to growth - the idea that the non-availability of appropriate management capabilities 
in the open market can serve as a constraint to the rate of endogenous firm growth. Little 
recognized in this literature, however, are the following; First, the potential existence of intra-
firm conflict; Second, is the potential for central management/entrepreneurial decisions to help 
remove constraints to growth by effecting intra-firm conflict resolution. Third, is the idea that one 
way for this to be achieved is through the choice of “open” (versus “closed”) innovation. The aim 
of our paper is to address these interrelated exciting possibilities/gaps in the literature, both 
conceptually and in the context of a simple formal model.  
Structure-wise, the next section identifies the issues to be addressed; immediately after 
that a formal model is presented that captures the main aspects or the issues under consideration. 
The final section has concluding remarks and discusses implications for managerial practice and 
future research. 
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2  Intra-firm conflict alleviation, innovation and growth 
 
Intra-firm conflict is a time-honored theme both in economics and in management 
scholarship, which however has been all but overlooked in more recent literature, which seems to 
be fixated to inter-firm rivalry, as in Porter (1980). The idea of divergent objectives between 
intra-firm groups, like for example, owners and managers is at the heart of managerial theories of 
the firm (see Marris, 1996), and of a thriving ‘agency’ literature (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; 
Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Mahoney, 2005; Pitelis and Teece, 2009). Cyert and March (1963) 
have taken the idea a step further in positing a potential divergence of interests between different 
departments in the firm, for example the central office (that seeks maximum profit) and the sales 
department (which is likely to be more interested in growth and market share). Such intra-firm 
divergence of objectives alongside bounded rationality, led Cyert and March to conclude that 
firms were more likely to pursue satisficing rather than profit maximizing levels of output 
(Organization Science, 2007). Empirically, the presence of intra-organisational political 
behaviour is both common and perceived to be so, see Buchanan (2008) for a critical account and 
evidence. 
In recent years, the resource, knowledge and/or dynamic capabilities-based views are 
dominating management scholarship on the theory of firm growth. Based on Penrose (1959), 
these views suggest that firms are superior to markets and/or other organizations in engendering 
knowledge, innovation and (dynamic) capabilities for value creation and value capture, which in 
their turn can lead to endogenous growth, and also help shift the various existing constraints to 
growth, such as Penrose’s well known ‘managerial constraint’. From the now large available 
literature on these issues, one can look at Penrose (1959), Wernerfelt (1984), Barney (1991), 
Peteraf (1993), Peteraf and Barney (2003), Teece et al. (1997), Teece (2007), Helfat et al. (2007) 
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and Katkalo et al. (2010). AMR (2007) discusses value creation and value capture in general and 
in the context of the RBV in particular while Coad (2007) provides an extensive survey on firm 
growth, including theories and constraints. Greve (2008) provides a behavioural perspective on 
firm growth that proposes a sequential approach to size and performance objectives. Becker and 
Huselid (2006) assess the state of the art in strategic human resource management (SHRM) and 
call for research on the mediating factors between HR and firm performance. 
The RBV all but ignores the issue of intra-firm conflict! This is likely to be a limitation, 
not least because conflict and conflict management may themselves be determinants of 
innovation, knowledge and capability creation-leveraging and (thus) firm growth. It is arguable 
for example, that the nature of intra-firm conflict may be an important determinant of the type of 
innovation selected by central management, in order to alleviate such conflict (Pitelis, 2007). 
Indicatively, the co-existence of intra-firm conflict, for example between different departments in 
a firm, and intense intra-firm rivalry, may tend to motivate exploitation versus exploration type 
innovations (March, 1991, 2008). 
Despite progress on the conceptual front, and some empirical, case examples-based 
support, the embryonic research of intra-firm conflict, knowledge-innovation and growth, 
remains rather impressionistic. This is even more the case for intra-firm conflict management. 
Our aim in this paper is to shed some light on aspects of this issue, notably on intra-firm conflict 
management, the choice between ‘open’ and ‘closed’ innovation and on how these impact on 
(constraints to) firm growth. 
“Open” innovation has recently assumed interest, in large part due to the path breaking 
work of Chesbrough (2003, 2006, 2007), von Hippel (2005) and others [see for example West 
and Gallagher (2006a, 2006b) for recent contributions]. At a general level, the issue of ‘open’ 
(versus ‘closed’) innovation is a variant of the internalization/externalization debate, or the ‘make 
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or buy’ (in this case sell, make or license) decision of firms, applied to the case of innovation or 
one of its possible sources, the R&D department. The ‘closure’ of innovation or the 
internalization of the forces of creative destruction, as aptly put by Penrose (1959), has been well 
documented by Alfred Chandler (1962). In contrast, the ‘open’ innovation model observes that 
firms can either buy and/or sell (their ‘surplus’) innovations, in the open market. ‘Open 
innovation’ is pursued by companies in sectors such as computers, IT and pharmaceutical, but 
also firms like Apple and Procter and Gamble. For example, the recent success of iPod can be 
explained in terms of the ability of Apple to use its internal portfolio of innovations, alongside 
externally sourced ones, as well as its complementary skills and capabilities for design and future 
demand appreciation and/or creation (Pitelis and Teece, 2010). 
The reasons behind the emerging move from closed to open innovation are hotly debated 
(see West and Gallagher, 2006a; von Hippel, 2005). Important considerations relate to firm size 
and the type of activity. For example, large firms may be in a better position to capture value 
from their innovation (and/or that of others), if they possess complementary capabilities and 
assets (Teece, 1986, 2006). Smaller firms may need to sell, cooperate or compete with larger 
players. The choice may depend on the sector. For example, Gans and Stern (2003) suggest that 
in sectors such as biotechnology, where there exist ‘markets for ideas’ and where patents are 
relatively effective, intra-firm cooperation is more common than in sectors such as electronics, 
where such conditions are absent, which in turn leads to head-on competition between large firms 
and innovative start-ups. 
We suggest that one potentially important consideration in the choice of open versus 
closed innovation (or more accurately perhaps, the ‘optimal’ mix of the two), is the need by firms 
to address issues of intra-firm divergence of interests and/or objectives. Such a need is proposed 
here to be one of the mediating factors that help articulate the relationship between SHRM and 
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firm performance, called for by Becker and Huselid (2006). Here we focus on intra-firm 
objective divergence between the R&D department and central management. Conflict between 
these two departments can arise because of different objectives (Cyert and March, 1963) and/or 
because the very operation of firms engenders knowledge and innovation in areas which central 
management perceives as (un)profitable to enter. For example, in the case of the British music 
company Electric and Musical Industries (EMI), the invention of the computerised tomography 
(CT) scanner resulted from a prolific R&D department that was given a mandate to pursue R&D 
of potential applicability to EMI’s main line of business. As it happened the CT scanner’s most 
obvious applicability was in the medical sector. That led to EMI’s choice – to internalize or 
sell/license the new technology. As it turned out, the decision of EMI to try and internalize the 
potential benefits from this invention through greenfield foreign investment in a new (US) market 
might have been misconceived (Teece, 1986). Central management could have chosen to 
sell/license the technology instead, to other companies with complementary assets (Teece, 1986). 
In cases such as this even if different groups (in this case the R&D department and central 
management) happen to share the same objective (let us say maximum profit from the 
innovation), different perceptions of how best to profit from the innovation, may well engender 
intra-firm conflict that can hinder growth. Such conflict is more likely to emerge if the two 
groups have different objectives. In such cases it is the prerogative of central management to take 
a strategic decision. We propose to show that in the presence of intra-firm conflict, the choice of 
open innovation (in this case sell or license the technology) may help effect conflict alleviation 
and shift constraints to growth.  
A limitation of the now voluminous literature on open innovation is that its results are 
often based on specific case examples, limiting the scope for generalization. Using a simple 
formal model can help address this problem. Given recent calls for some degree of formalisation 
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in management scholarship (see AMR, 2009), we present here a simple formal model that aims to 
capture the main elements from our analysis above, and help explain how intra-firm conflict 
management through open innovation, may help firms reduce conflict, shift constraints to growth 
and profit from their innovations.  
 
3  Conflict alleviation and firm growth through “open” innovation – a simple   
    formal model 
 
 
The basic tenets of our model are as follows. We assume a R&D active firm that pursues 
maximum possible profits, by pursuing investments financed mainly by retained profits (Penrose, 
1959; Chandler, 1962). 
In order to capture the possible conflict that may ensue between management and 
researchers and in order to simplify the analysis, we focus on firms whose structure is divided 
into two main different departments: a central management department, and an R&D department. 
An example that can best convey such a firm structure is Xerox, which Palo Alto Research 
Center has relative autonomy (from the management department) in decision making with respect 
to R&D. In what follows, we assume both departments to be fully informed about each other and 
consist of agents who are assumed to be homogenous for simplicity. In line with our discussion, 
it is also assumed that the central management department is ultimately responsible for strategic 
decision making.  
We assume the firm to produce output y using two inputs of production: the number of 
innovations K produced by the firm’s R&D department, and managerial capability A. In this 
setting K is similar to capital and A corresponds to managerial human resources. Since we 
concentrate on high-tech firms that focus on innovation and not on production we abstain from 
using labor as an input of production, limiting our discussion to K and A. Overall, production is 
 8 
described by the following function, αα KAy −= 1  ( )1,0∈α . In this context A is indicative of the 
firm’s managerial capacity to capture value added from K, within a specific business model, and 
with adequate managerial ability. 
Focusing our attention on K, our model endows innovations with effects akin to quasi-
homogeneous inputs. This view contrasts with the fact that a firm’s portfolio of innovations 
embraces many and sometimes diverse innovations, whose value seems independent from each 
other. Evidence to the contrary is amassed by Bessen and Meurer (2005), who observe decreasing 
returns to scale between the size of a software firm's patent portfolio and the probability of 
winning a patent litigation suit.1 In addition, (patented) innovations as a group are understood to 
allow the firm to benefit from intra-firm knowledge spillovers (and/or learning by doing) and to 
act as a barrier to entry to potential entrants, while also proving beneficial as bargaining tool in 
case of inter-firm rivalry.2  
This assumption of quasi-homogeneity is in line with Eaton and Schmitt (1994), and 
amounts to allowing the firm's innovations to be interlinked to an earlier innovation that acts as a 
common platform to most of the firm’s innovations. In a nutshell, a firm’s innovation portfolio K 
is made up of a set of technologies that advance a common platform (having a central idea as a 
backbone) to which they build on, or they elaborate upon. Therefore, innovations collectively 
describe a technological territory. This is akin to Penrose’s (1959) concept of the “technological 
base” and much in line with her description of the case of Hercules Powder (Penrose, 1960), and 
with recent managerial practice concerning technological platforms, see Parker and Astyne 
(2007). 
Denoting the average cost of innovation as c, and using output prices as a numeraire, the 
firm’s profits are cKKA −= − ααpi 1 , where c is small enough to allow 0>
∂
∂
K
pi
. Considering that 
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the firm is a profit maximizing one, the above formulation suggests that the optimal number of 
innovations from the management’s point of view (i.e. the one that maximizes profits) is 
A
c
K
αα −






=
1
1
*
. This result indicates that, along their profit maximizing path, firms that have a 
greater managerial ability are in need of a greater number of innovations. 
*K  constitutes management’s preferred number of innovations and as such it cannot 
always coincide with the firm’s actual K , because the latter depends on the R&D department’s 
capacity to innovate. Focusing on this disparity, one can expect the following three cases: a) 
KK <* , suggesting that the firm has a surplus of innovations, b) KK >* , indicating that the 
optimal K  is above current one leading to a deficit of innovations, and c) KK =* , which is an 
equilibrium case. In what follows we take a closer look at KK <*  and KK >* . We do not 
consider KK =*  any further because there is no rivalry in this case. 
 
4  A surplus of innovations 
 
A surplus of innovations is effectively a mismatch between *K  and K , which is equal to 
*KK − . Contemporary examples (such as Xerox’s Palo Alto Research Center) suggest that there 
exist cases where K  can surpass *K . Indeed, this case is in line with Penrose (1959) and the 
RBV, as it involves some “slack” and it raises the issue of its use (Cyert and March, 1963; Pitelis, 
2007). In what follows, we endeavour to shed some light on the strategies that firms follow in 
such an occasion. Specifically, along its profit maximizing path (the path captured by *K , which 
accords with the firm’s managerial ability, business plan and expectations), the firm can follow 
two different strategies in order to remedy this surplus: 
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 a.  a strategy that pursues strict profit maximization by forcing K
 
down to *K , thus risking 
creating rivalry between the two departments, which can be costly as it may lead 
researchers and ideas to exit the firm; this is a confrontational strategy. The firm’s profits 
from this strategy (excluding the cost of conflict) are **1 cKKA −= − ααpi .  
b. Alternatively, the firm can produce K , selling its surplus deriving profits that are equal to 
( )**1 KKccKKA −+−= − ααpi , where ( )*KKc −  captures the profits that the firm 
derives by selling its *KK −
 
surplus for a price c.  
Strategy (b) is an open innovation strategy. It suffices to say that, even though the firm operates 
in a competitive environment, the price for *KK −  does not need to be c. However, to keep the 
model tractable we abstain from shifting attention to c and how it is determined. After all, it is 
intuitive that firms that can get a higher selling price for their innovations are more likely to 
pursue such a strategy. Yet the issue here is not how c affects a firm’s decision but the rivalry 
ensuing from a discrepancy between managerial ability and innovativeness.  
Needless to say that the firm may equally: 
1   decide to stop its operation 
2   function using K
 
3   continue producing K  and use *K , failing to maximize profits.  
 
As all these strategies are outside the firm’s profit maximizing path, we do not pursue them 
further. In any case, a strategy of halting operation is always strictly dominated by strategies (a) 
and (b). In addition a strategy of using K  only (deriving profits cKKA −= − ααpi *1 ) is always 
strictly dominated by strategy (b). Moreover, if the firm continues producing K  but uses *K , 
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considering that its profits are cKKA −= − ααpi *1 , and bearing in mind that )*KK > , strategy a) 
always strictly dominates this strategy. 
Shifting our attention to strategies (a) and (b), strategy (b) is dominant if 
( )*KKccK −+−  is greater than *cK− . Rearranging terms we derive that strategy (b) is 
dominant if )*KK > , which is always true. It follows that in the presence of intra-firm conflict, 
“open innovation” can serve as a means to capture value from “excess innovation” avoiding the 
risk of intensifying intra-firm conflict.  
 
5  A deficit of innovations 
 
Shifting our attention to a deficit KK −*  in the number of innovations, given that R&D 
department cannot deliver what management needs to maximize profits, the deficit in the number 
of innovations will tend to create some rivalry between management and the R&D department. 
Such rivalry is far from unknown in the business world, and even though it is frequently 
manifested in the delay of introducing novel products (as in the Airbus 380) such delays do not 
fully convey the problems faced by the firms and the solutions chosen. In what follows, we 
endeavour to shed some light on the strategies that firms follow in such an occasion. Specifically, 
in symmetry to the surplus case, along its profit maximizing path the firm can pursue two 
different strategies in order to remedy this deficit: 
a. a confrontational strategy where, in the hope of achieving *K , the R&D personnel must 
be replaced with one of higher quality (at a cost) 
b. an open innovation strategy that promotes the acquisition of the KK −*  innovations from 
external sources; at a cost c per innovation.3  
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Needless to say, that the firm may equally decide to stop its operation, or function using K  only. 
As both of these strategies are outside the firm’s profit maximizing path, we do not pursue them 
further. In addition, a strategy of halting operation is always strictly dominated by strategies (a) 
and (b). Furthermore, if the firm decides to function by using K  only, comparisons between 
strategies and dominance must inevitably depend on the cost of acquiring the KK −*  deficit, 
which is, in any case, the main theme of the analysis that follows. 
In what follows, we elaborate on the conditions under which strategy (b) is dominant. 
Specifically, in terms of strategy (a), if the firm wants to equate *K  to K  then it must hire new 
researchers at a cost which can be found (by equating *K  to K ) as 
)1(
ˆ
α
α
−






=
K
A
c ; this is the cost 
of intra-firm conflict. This equation suggests that firms with a high managerial capacity , as 
they require a greater *K , need to pay a higher price cˆ . Such a need is ameliorated when, having 
a large K , the firm is capable of producing such innovations on its own, reducing cˆ . 
Subsequently, the price of intra-firm conflict must be higher for firms with a high  and a low 
. 
By contrast, if the firm follows strategy b) it must also account for the cost c  of acquiring 
the KK −*  deficit. Thus, in the latter case the firm’s profits are ( )KKccKKA −−−= − **1 ααpi . 
In order to examine the issue of the dominant strategy, we need to compare the profits from 
strategy a) (i.e. **1 ˆKcKA −= − ααpi ) to the above noted ones from strategy b). Simple algebra 
helps determine that strategy b) is dominant if cc >ˆ . Noting that 
)1(
ˆ
α
α
−






=
K
A
c , cc >ˆ  can be re-
expressed as,  
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(1)                                                   c
K
A
>





− )1( α
α .  
It would appear that the greater the firm’s managerial capability A  is, the greater its need 
for innovations *K , a need that, as long as there exists an innovation deficit, can create intra-firm 
rivalry that is manifested through cˆ . Subsequently, as equation (1) suggests, we should expect 
cc >ˆ  to be binding for firms with a high A . Intuitively, firms that have a small K  are candidates 
for an open innovation strategy, because the smaller the K  is the larger the left hand side of 
equation (1) leading to cc >ˆ . 
 
6  Open innovation and firm growth 
 
In the preceding sub-sections we explained how and when rivalry can lead the firm to 
follow an open innovation strategy, by shifting constraints to firm growth. Here we focus 
specifically on firm growth by exploring the dynamic implications of open innovation between 
firms. Considering that open innovation is a generic term under whose aegis one frequently 
encounters firm acquisition, leveraged buyouts, startup innovations, stake-holding through 
venture capital financing, and many other forms of inter-firm cooperation that facilitate 
technology transfer, it may be best to elaborate on our use of the term and its implications.   
Specifically, for our purpose (and in contrast to in-house technological development) 
open innovation is defined here as any activity that allows a firm to benefit from the technology 
of another firm, incorporating its skills, knowledge and technological capital, along with at least 
some of its managerial expertise. Firms have proved very innovative in devising such 
agreements. For example, pharmaceutical firms are well known to frequently buy innovative 
start-up firms. On the other hand, Intel finances (through venture capital) many innovative start-
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up firms, whose technology may prove beneficial for Intel’s uses. Through such financing Intel 
indirectly controls R&D planning and managerial practices. 
The above definition implies that when a firm chooses to follow an open innovation 
strategy it also increases its managerial capability A. This increase does not take place if rivalry is 
remedied through a strategy of confrontation as in strategy a). To capture this increase we 
henceforth formalize A as a function of the overall size s of the firm’s managerial department, 
and we denote it as , where 0, . The emerging concavity is the result of a 
managerial department, which is spread thin by the existence of many innovations stemming 
from many different sources that need to be managed and coordinated; namely Penrose’s 
managerial constraint to growth. 
Consequently, the incorporation, through open innovation, of additional technology and 
managerial skills leads  to grow by  to . Hence, considering that  is a 
function of managerial capacity it must also increase from ( ) ( )sA
c
sK
αα −






=
1
1
*
 to 
( ) ( )ssA
c
ssK ∆+





=∆+
−αα 1
1
*
, while the firm’s stock of innovations is steady at 
( ) ( )sA
c
sK
αα −






=
1
1
, creating a deficit of innovations (because ), and intra-
firm rivalry. In a fashion similar to our previous analysis, this rivalry can be remedied through a 
confrontational strategy, or an open innovation strategy, where an open innovation strategy is 
dominant so long as equation (1) holds, i.e. ( )( ) csK
ssA
>




 ∆+
− )1( α
α . Substituting 
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( ) ( )sA
c
sK
αα −






=
1
1
 into the latter equation, after some rearranging, we derive that open 
innovation is optimal if ( ) ( )sAssA >∆+ .  
It follows from the above, intra-firm rivalry does not only help firms grow, by shifting 
constraints to growth through open innovation, but it can also have a direct positive effect on firm 
growth. This growth will stop when ( ) ( )sAssA =∆+ . Considering that 0, , 
indicating that  must converge (as s increases) to an upper barrier, this growth is not 
unlimited but it will stop when ( ) ( )sAssA →∆+ . We capture this firm growth in Figure 1, 
where, through equiproportional increases of s∆ , the firm grows until it converges to an upper 
barrier. 
 
Figure 1. Converging firm growth 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A 
s 
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There follows from the above that in the presence of intra-firm conflict, “open 
innovation” can serve the dual purpose of helping firms to profit from “innovation” as well as to 
avoid the risk of intensifying intra-firm conflict. It also allows firms to continue growing and 
keep profiting from their innovations.    
 
7  Limitations, sense-making, managerial practice and future research 
 
The idea that intra-firm conflict can serve as a constraint to firm growth and that strategic 
decisions by entrepreneurs/central management on the choice of “open” versus “closed” 
innovation can help effect both conflict resolution, remove constraints to growth and directly 
facilitates firm growth, is both novel and unexplored in the literature, conceptually, analytically 
and empirically. In this paper we attempted a first move in the direction of addressing this 
important limitation.   
Our results have the usual advantages and disadvantages of formal modeling. On the 
positive side, they specify exact conditions under which strategic decisions, as applied to the case 
of intra-firm conflict between departments, can motivate the adoption of a strategy (‘open 
innovation’) that helps mitigate conflict and remove constraints to growth. In this sense, our 
results shed light on an important issue that combines the concerns of leading classic scholars 
such as Penrose and Cyert and March with the innovative works and findings of Chesbrough 
(2007). On the other hand conflict resolution and the choice of ‘open’ versus closed innovation 
are likely to be affected by a multiplicity of factors, not allowed for by our model. Considering 
current calls for a degree of formal theorizing in management scholarship (see AMR, 2009), we 
hope our contribution makes a small step in the right direction. 
A second limitation of the model is that it describes what happens if there is a ‘deficit’ or 
a ‘surplus’ of innovation. However, it does not explain which is more likely, and it fails to 
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provide a plausible story. We feel that there exists a story that is in line with our results and also 
with the contribution of Penrose (1959) and Cyert and March (1963). According to this, at the 
early stages of their development, start-ups, especially high-tech entrepreneurial firms, are likely 
to have more management talent than sources of funding for their intra-firm R&D. This could 
result to a search for innovation, from wherever this may be available, favouring an ‘open 
innovation’ approach. As firms grow, and an R&D department emerges, the gap will tend to 
close. However, due to indivisibilities and intra-firm learning, as described by Penrose (1959), it 
is unlikely that actual R will coincide with profit maximizing, R, most probably surpassing it in 
cases and leading to ‘surplus’ innovations. In such cases central management have the choice to 
cut down on R, or to pursue an ‘open innovation’ approach, selling, licensing and/or leveraging 
internally ‘surplus’ innovation.  
Whether to ‘sell or make’ depends on a host of other considerations, not discussed here, 
see for example Teece (1986; 2006), Williamson (1991) and Wolter and Veloso (2008). Our 
claim is that ceteris paribus the choice of ‘open innovation’ compares well with the choice of 
cutting down on R, as it helps ameliorate intra-firm conflict and remove constraints to growth. In 
conclusion, this strategic choice of open versus closed innovation can be seen as a partial 
response to intra-firm conflict reduction by central management, or as a form of strategic decision 
that helps remove constraints to growth, by allowing the continuation of innovation-knowledge 
generation. Despite extensive interest on constraints to firm growth, intra-firm conflict and 
knowledge/innovation, and the role of management and entrepreneurial decisions on growth, this 
particular aspect of the issue has not been previously explored. We therefore hope to have made a 
contribution in this direction, while responding at least partly to calls to identify mediating factors 
between SHRM and firm performance (Becker and Huselid, 2006). 
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Our results have quite straightforward and rather powerful implications for managerial 
practice. They suggest that an ‘open innovation’ approach is ceteris paribus preferable to closed 
innovation, as it can help alleviate intra-firm conflict, shift constraints to growth and increase 
firm growth and profitability. It is precisely the simplicity and strength of such results that 
suggests caution. In particular further research is needed that analyses the sensitivity of these 
results to moderating factors not accounted for in our analysis and discussed below. 
Concerning further research, it remains crucial to explore the choice of ‘open’ versus 
‘closed’ innovation and types of intra-firm conflict resolution, by taking into accounts other 
factors. For the former case, these include the type of activity, (and inter-firm rivalry), 
‘appropriability regime’, markets for technology, (Arora et al., 2008), different ways of intra-firm 
incentive alignment (Simon, 1995), the role of complementary assets (Teece, 1986; 2006), the 
role of new entry, see Research Policy (2006), and open innovation between firms and other 
organisations. We hope that our results help shed some light on some important issues that have 
been hitherto unexplored and that we will motivate others too to research further the exciting 
issue of intra-firm conflict, “open-innovation” and firm growth.  
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Notes 
                                                
1
 As they argue, “...the idea of diminishing returns to patent portfolio size may seem 
counterintuitive. After all, if two firms merge, pooling their patent portfolios, why should this 
affect the role of litigation per patent? But such a merger would affect the probability of 
winning a suit against a third firm” (p. 3). 
2
  See Hall and Ziedonis (2001). 
3
 An alternative option for the firm, as firms frequently combine open innovation with a 
restructuring of their R&D department, would be to use mixed strategies. Nevertheless, our 
prime objective in this paper is to analyze the raison d'être behind each strategy. 
